With expectations set last week that Callide B1 would be back online yesterday at minimum load, I’ve had a quick look and can’t see it yet…
2021 – 25th May – Callide C4 Explosion, Fire and Outage
A collection of articles that began on Tuesday 25th May 2021, when Callide C4 unit exploded, which:
1) Led to loss of supply from sister units Callide C3, and B2 and B1 – but also others close
2) And also blackouts for a sizeable amount of Queensland due to under-frequency load shedding
3) And a very long repair process
4) Hence some concerns about the supply-demand balance, and prices
5) And an insolvency of one of the JV owners
6) There also was a lengthy process to report on the original cause of the explosion.
In this category we collate an expanding range of articles related to one or more of the above.
A short note about some further delays in return to service for Callide B1 and C3 … though earlier return for B2
Discussion in a number of different places (including an AFR article today) prompted me to pull some data together of how (spot and futures) prices have trended through 2021, and how they changed with the Callide C4 problems.
High Contingency FCAS prices (Raise 6 second) in response to what’s happened at Callide Power Station drove the Cumulative Price to (6 times) the Cumulative Price Threshold. Administered Pricing began Saturday evening for QLD.
Evening spot price volatility has become a regular thing – here’s some of it for Thursday 3rd June 2021
A short note, following AEMO reporting estimated costs for RERT (Reserve Trader) on Tuesday 25th May 2021 in QLD.
On LinkedIn this afternoon, Josh Stabler (of Energy Edge) identified another consideration for the repair process for the significantly damaged Callide C4 steam turbine.
A client sent in this ez2view image this afternoon pointing out another factor that’s been occurring in the absence of 4 x Callide units – markedly increased production from gas-fired generation.
In order to assist discussions on social media about what’s been happening with Callide C4 over the past 10 years, using the GSD2020 I’ve published some actual detailed performance metrics.
The AEMO has released its 22-page Preliminary Report into the Callide C4 Catastrophe and the subsequent events.
We’ve started exploring the constraint data from the QLD region for back on Tuesday 25th May 2021 (with the Callide C4 catastrophe) and here’s some initial information.
A note of thanks to Mark Ludlow at the AFR for the compilation of some great initial information about what happened at Callide C4 unit just over a week ago (on Tue 25th May 2021).
For ease of future reference, here is the list of events that occurred on Tuesday 25th May 2021 … as we (currently) see them.
A number of things happened late today – with the trip of DDPS1 (only declare credible contingency earlier in the day) giving more impetus to spot price volatility in the QLD and NSW regions already facing tight supply/demand following the Callide catastrophe and LOR1 in NSW.
First short article for Tuesday evening following report from CS Energy that the return to service
This evening I’ve taken a first pass look at how QLD generators bid on Tuesday 25th May 2021, in response to the tight supply/demand balance created by the Callide C4 outage and cascade of events.
Whilst there were many things that went wrong on Tuesday 25th May 2021 (last week), guest author Allan O’Neil highlights that there were at least 4 things that went right – contributing to a much less severe outcome than would otherwise have been the case.
Carl Daley from EnergyByte, provides more insight into the events of last Tuesday, which culminated in widespread blackouts throughout Queensland.
On Friday evening (28th May) and again this evening (Sun 30th May) my phone buzzed plenty of times – due to price volatility, and also alerting on low IRPM (enabled with Callide units offline, and low wind harvest at peak demand time).
Two brief (but important) observations made possible with a chart published on RenewEconomy with respect to the Hornsdale Power Reserve.