A recent development over in the WEM (paying energy users to consume, when there’s too much solar and wind) highlights the lack of foresight in the NEM … where we’ve implemented a significant reform (yet to start) that will do nothing to address negative prices.
Considerations on how key aspects of the upcoming wholesale mechanism might dictate how much response capability will be realised once the mechanism goes live before Summer 2021-22
My understanding is that the AEMC’s Final Rule relating to the push to implement a ‘Negawatt Dispatch Mechanism’ will be released in the morning. I wonder what the implications will actually turn out to be…
Better late than never (perhaps?) today I post a few thoughts about the AEMC’s proposed draft rule change for the incorporation of NegaWatts into centralized dispatch.
A collection of thoughts that have been bumping around in my head for some time about the latest push by various parties to facilitate a broader range of demand response in the NEM, and whether there are better options
One more example of not focusing on the real problems seems to be a tendency for some to obsess about one narrow type of Demand Response (i.e. dispatch of NegaWatts) whilst seeming to lose focus of what the overall objective is (a more active and responsive demand side).
Some ideas that I have been puzzling over – about the overlaps and contradictions between 3 rule changes under consideration at the AEMC currently
1) The Demand Response Mechanism (better known as the Negawatt buyback mechanism)
2) The Bidding in Good Faith deliberation
3) The Requirement for Price-Responsive (large) Demand to bid into central dispatch