The second part of an ongoing case study examining two successive days of low VRE generation in early July 2023. This part examines IRPM, earlier forecasts of available generation and maps the availability by site location.
Guest author, Allan O’Neil, takes a detailed look at how VIC1-NSW1 transfer capability has been limited frequently due to constraints related to the 051 line in southern NSW, and what it means in terms of inter-regional settlements residue accumulations, market efficiency overall, and the energy transition.
A brief article as a first Case Study looking at Mon 3rd and Tue 4th July 2023, in conjunction with the compilation of GenInsights Quarterly Updates for 2023 Q3.
A brief article as a first Case Study looking at Friday 18th August 2023, in conjunction with the compilation of GenInsights Quarterly Updates for 2023 Q3.
On Wednesday 6th September many Semi-Scheduled (wind and solar) units in northern QLD were ‘constrained down’ for System Strength reasons. We take a first look as part 1 of a Case Study (more parts *may* follow).
In this article we delve in deeper on Thu 30th Jan and Fri 31st Jan 2020 … two days that saw extreme levels of ‘Aggregate Scheduled Target’ (i.e. AggSchedTarget – a requirement for firming capacity). A timely review, given two developments arriving tomorrow (on Thursday 31st August 2023).
A short article today (whilst in the midst of finalising GenInsights Quarterly Update for Q1 2023) presenting an overview of Aggregate Raw Off-Target (AggROT) for Semi-Scheduled units on Friday 3rd February 2023.
Given the significance of the event (Reserve Trader almost triggered on Thursday 16th March – 34 days till the closure of Liddell Unit 4) we’re investing some time in exploring more detail of the event. This is Part 1.
In Part 1 of this Case Study, we start to look at the large collective under-performance across all Semi-Scheduled units (i.e. Wind and Large Solar) at 17:05 on 27th October 2022. More to come in subsequent parts…
Walking through some of the responses I can see in 19 of 67 Wind Farm units on Wednesday 10th August 2022 … when a software glitch delivered extreme contingency FCAS prices across all regions (though they were subsequently revised down).
It’s now seven months since the SCADA outage on Sunday 24th January 2021 – and we’re finally able to complete and publish this (quite long) article exploring some of the implications for units on the LHS of the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation
The price has spiked in South Australia this evening (Fri 12th March 2021). Here’s Part 1…
Following a presentation to the EESA in September, Dr Robert May and Ashley Nicholls from SA Water have written a case study detailing the sophisticated energy management system that they have developed over the past 7 years.
On 25th November, guest author Allan O’Neil examined the ‘X5 Constraint’. Two weeks of operation have passed, so now Allan reviews some of what’s happened.
Given the great interest in the new ‘X5 constraint’, guest author, Allan O’Neil, has invested some time to pick the new constraint equation to understand (and then explain) what it is, how likely it will be to bind, and who is likely to be affected.
In part 4 of this expanding Case Study of the unexpected price spike on Tuesday 13th Oct, linked to a large & sudden drop in output across 10 solar farms, we take a quick look at what happened at most of the QLD generators through this 10:00 trading period.
In part 3 of this expanding Case Study of the unexpected price spike on Tuesday 13th Oct, linked to a large & sudden drop in output across 10 solar farms, we dig deeper to explore… including wondering whether it would have been expected in advance.
Based on some preliminary analysis of the Powerlink’s ‘Qdata’ set (available in ez2view) we present our current hypothesis as to the sequence of the events yesterday in the QLD region, where 600MW of solar generation was lost, causing the price to spike to MPC.
This 20th Case Study (the other side of the weekend to the 19th Case Study) in the series investigates one dispatch interval showing extreme Aggregate Under-Performance across all Semi-Scheduled units on Monday 8th April 2019.
This 19th Case Study in the series investigates one dispatch interval showing extreme Aggregate Under-Performance across all Semi-Scheduled units on Friday 5th April 2019.