Solar and wind forecasting systems experience 4 hour outage on November 10, 2026
A return to use of AWEFS/ASEFS forecasts, for units not using self-forecasts, is not evident until 22:25; 4 hours after the start.
A return to use of AWEFS/ASEFS forecasts, for units not using self-forecasts, is not evident until 22:25; 4 hours after the start.
Presenting this single image which summarises the sequence of events (for a number of Semi-Scheduled units) over three dispatch intervals across the pair of frequency spikes (on Fri 10th and Sat 11th April 2026).
Next layer of the onion, in investigating the eerily similar (and closely related) frequency spikes outside the NOFB on Friday 10th April 2026 and Saturday 11th April 2026.
AWEFS and ASEFS dispatch availability forecast systems experienced what looks to be an outage and we uncover how the 'SCADA' origin filled the gap.
Information spanned a wide range of topics related to intermittent generator forecasting, and included a guest presentation by the AER.
It is indispensable to understand how the semi-scheduled unit availability gets produced to optimally manage the critical inputs and comprehend dispatch outcomes. This article explains the key inputs and processes, focusing on the dispatch timeframe.
We delve deeper into dispatch availability self-forecasts and the assessment process to further enhance our understanding of this important aspect, testing sensitivity to gate closure times and requirements on minimum intervals.
A short article, to record the upgrade of the ASEFS and AWEFS forecasts for Semi-Scheduled (i.e. Wind and Large Solar) units.
Following from the release of GenInsights21, in this article we look at some of what that analytical publication can help us understand, in terms of how the changing market is impacting on the role that renewables will increasingly play in the NEM in the years...
As promised in the Intermittent Generation Forum late in 2020, the AEMO has released an important Handbook for operators of Semi-Scheduled (wind and solar) assets.
This is the 12th Case Study in this series (looking at each of 98 extreme incidents). This one is simpler than the 11th Case Study!
A brief look at what's been happening at Bald Hills Wind Farm - over the 18 months since January 2019, but most particularly in the past couple weeks where output has dropped down near zero.
This is the 3rd of 4 Case Studies to follow on from the main article (summarising results across 105,120 dispatch intervals through 2019 for ‘all Coal’ and ‘all Wind’ groupings). In this case, let’s look at the ‘worst’ case, in aggregate, where wind units under-performed...
In her first article for WattClarity, Marcelle looks at questions raised in the recent summer on the forecasting of performance at high temperatures of wind and solar generators, and asks how AEMO and industry can work together to improve this.
Today I managed to get about half-way (only!) through some analysis I wanted to do to 'scratch that itch' about what happened in the NSW Region on Thursday 23rd January - with LOR2 conditions necessitating RERT (Reserve Trader) in the NSW Region.