Here’s a snapshot of the ‘Unit Dashboard’ widget in ez2view of the HPRG1 unit (i.e. the pre-IESS generation side DUID for the Hornsdale Power Reserve) on Monday 13th December 2021
Some price volatility in South Australia on Monday 13th December 2021
A short article (in the midst of GenInsights21 completion) more broadly sharing 2 good news stories from AEMO in the context of the NEMDE dispatch process.
Another set of ‘file creation’ data for the P5 Predispatch prepared by one of our team yesterday (Monday 15th November) suggests the file creation latency issues we highlighted in August are ongoing.
A short back-dated article, to link in AEMO’s final report on this incident.
It’s now seven months since the SCADA outage on Sunday 24th January 2021 – and we’re finally able to complete and publish this (quite long) article exploring some of the implications for units on the LHS of the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation
Re-posted with update: In recent weeks we have noticed a trend towards increased latency in the creation of the ‘PUBLIC_P5MIN_*.csv’ files published by AEMO on MarketNet, and we wonder if you can help us understand why this is happening?
Whilst there were many things that went wrong on Tuesday 25th May 2021 (last week), guest author Allan O’Neil highlights that there were at least 4 things that went right – contributing to a much less severe outcome than would otherwise have been the case.
Carl Daley from EnergyByte, provides more insight into the events of last Tuesday, which culminated in widespread blackouts throughout Queensland.
A deeper look at the frequency data (our own, and also from some others) reveals a number of other interesting things about what happened on Tuesday 25th May 2021 in Queensland.
My evening reading of an ABC news article (about Callide C) released this afternoon suggests a long, long and expensive outage for Callide C4.
Normally this would be part of a much more complete article adding to WattClarity’s growing coverage of the major power system events in Queensland following the incident at Callide C Power Station. However I for one find it easier to…
Sharing 7 of the ‘Headline Questions’ we’re pondering, as we bury ourselves in the data surrounding the events that happened on Tuesday 25th May … some of which will have long-lasting implications (not to mention detailed investigations).
Part 5 in an expanding series, looking at what happened in QLD on Tuesday 25th May 2021 – this one looking at system frequency.
First update, day after the event, shows a cautious (initial) approach to returning the 4 units at the Callide site back to service.
Third short article this evening, after it looks like we’ve escaped from a tight supply/demand balance (reasonably) unscathed.
Looks set to be a very tight supply/demand balance this evening in Queensland. Here’s hoping everything goes right for the AEMO Control Room!
A quick snapshot from NEMwatch at 14:20 today highlighting the loss of approximately 2000MW of demand this afternoon – dropping the level of Scheduled Demand down to 3,775MW: The AEMO Market Notice highlighted says: ——————————————————————- MARKET NOTICE ——————————————————————- From : …
More time has elapsed since ‘Part 3’ on 24th March – today I’m posting a shorter piece (Part 4) that explains how RHS of the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation drove down output and led to the price spike on Sunday 24th January 2021.
It’s taken a while to find the time – but today I’m posting this next analytical piece (Part 3) that seeks to understand what happened on Sunday 24th January 2021 with the NEM-wide SCADA Failure, which contributed to the price spike that occurred in QLD by virtue of what it did to the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation.