More time has elapsed since ‘Part 3’ on 24th March – today I’m posting a shorter piece (Part 4) that explains how RHS of the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation drove down output and led to the price spike on Sunday 24th January 2021.
It’s taken a while to find the time – but today I’m posting this next analytical piece (Part 3) that seeks to understand what happened on Sunday 24th January 2021 with the NEM-wide SCADA Failure, which contributed to the price spike that occurred in QLD by virtue of what it did to the ‘Q>>NIL_CLWU_RGLC’ constraint equation.
Following from (what we have seen as) an increase in diversity of concerns (and claims) about different aspects of generator performance, we’re leveraging our extensive data set and capabilities to have a deeper look, leading to the publication of a Generator Report Card with data to 31st December 2018. We’d welcome input from those who wish to pre-order their copies now at an initial low rate.
This morning over on Twitter, I was pulled into a discussion that had started with respect to volume of wind energy curtailed in South Australia: The genesis of this…
Following on from the Let’s Talk About FCAS post, the focus of this post is the business case and subsequent optimisation challenge for getting involved in FCAS, now that the technical performance components have been mostly addressed.
AEMO has adjusted the formula (i.e. constraint equations) used to manage system strength in South Australia, which has been (since mid-2017) by constraining down the output of wind farms under certain conditions.
An article that sums up some decidedly un-quick calculations we’ve performed – looking over an 8 week period to 13th September to estimate how much wind power has been curtailed by the AEMO.